Open AccessOn the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness
Author(s) -
Matthias Michel,
Hakwan Lau
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
philosophy and the mind sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2699-0369
DOI - 10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.54
Subject(s) - conflation , consciousness , neocortex , electromagnetic theories of consciousness , cognitive science , epistemology , psychology , cognitive psychology , philosophy , neuroscience
Some proponents of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness profess strong views on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC), namely that large swathes of the neocortex, the cerebellum, at least some sensory cortices, and the so-called limbic system are all not essential for any form of conscious experiences. We argue that this connection is not incidental. Conflation between strong and weak versions of the theory has led these researchers to adopt definitions of NCC that are inconsistent with their own previous definitions, inadvertently betraying the promises of an otherwise fruitful empirical endeavour.