Open AccessThe Role of Values in Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy
Author(s) -
Paul S. Loeb
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
the agonist
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2752-4140
pISSN - 2752-4132
DOI - 10.33182/agon.v15i3.1903
Subject(s) - metaphilosophy , philosophy , epistemology , interpretation (philosophy) , meaning (existential) , prima facie , reading (process) , power (physics) , philosophy of science , modern philosophy , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics
The goal of this essay is to show how we might gain new insight into the meaning of Nietzsche’s metaphilosophical lessons at the start of Beyond Good and Evil. Maudemarie Clark’s interpretation of these lessons is prima facie plausible and has gained widespread acceptance in the Anglophone community of Nietzsche scholars. According to this reading, Nietzsche thinks that philosophers cannot help but project their preferred values into their theories of the world and he thinks that this is true of his own theory of the world as will to power. I argue that there are severe problems with Clark’s supporting textual evidence and that we should therefore reconsider how we usually think today about the role of values in Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy and about the epistemic status that he grants to his own philosophical theories.