
DISCUSSING THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVES - BASED PLANNING: A CRITIQUE
Author(s) -
Zoltán Jobbágy,
LASZLO SZEGO
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
sodobni vojaški izzivi
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2463-9575
pISSN - 2232-2825
DOI - 10.33179/bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.13.3.6
Subject(s) - military strategy , politics , process (computing) , political science , military theory , management science , epistemology , operations research , engineering , computer science , law , philosophy , operating system
The process of strategy development as seen by most Western militaries is very much shaped by Clausewitz, who regarded the political aim the ultimate goal of war. Despite all his merits and contribution to the theory of war, Clausewitz’s approach to strategy development appears to be too narrow for the military engagements we saw in Iraq and still see in Afghanistan. In counter-insurgency operations both the formulation of political goals and the application of military means are influenced by so many factors that strategy development often appears as a messy and painful process of trial-and-error. The authors expand on this issue and deliver a critique to the wide spread objective-based approach to developing strategy.