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Afinal, Quais Instituições Importam? Equilíbrios Políticos, Concentração e Dispersão de Poder e Decisões
Author(s) -
André Marenco
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
political observer
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2795-4765
pISSN - 2795-4757
DOI - 10.33167/2184-2078.rpcp2020.13/pp.87-104
Subject(s) - veto , politics , sovereignty , order (exchange) , balance (ability) , power (physics) , welfare economics , economics , government (linguistics) , political science , positive economics , philosophy , law , psychology , physics , linguistics , finance , quantum mechanics , neuroscience
Institutions, was the answer presented by the positive theory, in the last three decades to explain the production of political equilibria. However, the following question is inevitable: Which institutional setting is most apt to produce stable political order and balance? Concentrated power based on the sovereign’s political virtues? Government divided into veto points that neutralize each other? This article revisits the literature that examines the effects produced by different institutional designs on stability and polyarchic performance, showing that there is no univocal and consensual connection between institutional configuration and generated results.

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