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Hintikka on Descartes's Cogito
Author(s) -
Nicola Ciprotti
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
nordicum-mediterraneum
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1670-6242
DOI - 10.33112/nm.4.1.6
Subject(s) - cogito ergo sum , counterexample , inference , epistemology , interpretation (philosophy) , philosophy , statement (logic) , foundationalism , computer science , linguistics , mathematics , discrete mathematics
In the early Sixties Jaakko Hintikka wrote a couple of papers devoted to arguing that Descartes's saying 'cogito ergo sum' is not, contrary to well-established opinion, a deductive inference built upon contingent facts of the matter, but rather a necessarily self-verifying statement of existence. The paper purports to show that, even when read according to Hintikka's interpretation, 'cogito ergo sum' admits of a counterexample, and thus accomplishes much less than it is commonly taken to do by foundationalist programmes in epistemology.

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