Open AccessMoral Vegetarianism and the Philosophy of Mind
Author(s) -
C.J. Oswald
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
stance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.9.1.67-72
Subject(s) - consciousness , moral philosophy , psychology , epistemology , order (exchange) , philosophy , moral psychology , social psychology , environmental ethics , economics , finance
Most arguments for moral vegetarianism rely on thepremise that non-human animals can suffer. In this paper I evaluateproblems that arise from Peter Carruthers’ Higher-Order Thoughttheory of consciousness. I argue that, even if we assume that theseproblems cannot be overcome, it does not follow that we should notsubscribe to moral vegetarianism. I conclude that we should act as ifnon-human animals have subjective experiences for moral reasons,even if we cannot be certain that they do.