Open AccessThere Are No Genuine Disagreements about Funniness
Author(s) -
Eric Badovinatz
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
stance an international undergraduate philosophy journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.8.1.29-37
Subject(s) - premise , argument (complex analysis) , meaning (existential) , epistemology , psychology , social psychology , sociology , philosophy , medicine
I argue that there are no genuine disagreements about whether something is funny. My argument rests largely on the premise that something is funny only if someone experiences it as funny. The bulk of this paper is spent supporting this premise, primarily through an analysis of the meaning of “funniness.” The rest of the paper is spent demonstrating how my conclusion follows from this premise.
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