Open AccessCarruthers and Constitutive Self-Knowledge
Author(s) -
J. C. Hill
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
stance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.6.1.71-78
Subject(s) - skepticism , self knowledge , epistemology , psychology , cognition , philosophy , neuroscience
In his recent book, The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers advances a skeptical theory of self-knowledge, integrating results from experimental psychology and cognitive science.1 In this essay, I want to suggest that the situation is not quite as dire as Carruthers makes it out to be. I respond to Carruthers by advancing a constitutive theory of self-knowledge. I argue that self-knowledge, so understood, is not only compatible with the empirical research that Carruthers utilizes, but also helps to make sense of these results.