z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
The Principle of Implicit Ignorance
Author(s) -
Phillip Curtsmith
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
stance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.5.1.63-73
Subject(s) - ignorance , foundationalism , equivalence (formal languages) , a priori and a posteriori , epistemology , philosophy , linguistics
The following is a foundationalist exercise based upon a single observation or postulate distinguishing one’s knowledge of information versus one’s knowledge of one’s former unknowing of that information. This postulate is titled the “principle of implicit ignorance.” Utilizing this postulate, several theorems are constructed including the equivalence to Hume’s thesis regarding the absence of knowledge of a necessary connection. The postulate is then negated, demonstrating equivalence to Kant’s thesis regarding the presence of synthetic a priori statements. The final result is a single general epistemic postulate that brokers between the two respective positions. Because both systems are the result of this general principle, rejecting the results of one system necessarily forces one into the contrary position.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here