Open AccessFull Blooded Conceptual Realism as a Response to Skeptical Relativism
Author(s) -
Micah Phillips-Gary
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
stance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.14.1.53-65
Subject(s) - skepticism , epistemology , relativism , realism , platonism , empirical evidence , certainty , philosophy , psychology
In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects exist) as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some aspect, then objective knowledge is possible, regardless of how these concepts arose historically.