Problems of Framing
Author(s) -
Augustus Wachbrit
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
stance an international undergraduate philosophy journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.13.1.118-129
Subject(s) - fatalism , framing (construction) , epistemology , framing effect , social psychology , sociology , psychology , philosophy , history , archaeology , persuasion
In “Fatalism and Time,” Mark Bernstein argues against the notion that the B-theory of time is fatalistic. However, when he frames the differences between the A-theory of time and the B-theory of time, I argue that Bernstein imports some troublesome conceptual baggage in the form of what he calls “atemporal truths,” which, in the end, dooms the B-theory to fatalism, the consequence he sought to avoid. From my examination of Bernstein’s framing of the B-theory of time, I suggest that, given the proper framing of that theory, it is not doomed to fatalism.
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