Open AccessMary Does Not Learn Anything New
Author(s) -
Adam Khayat
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
stance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.12.1.44-55
Subject(s) - physicalism , causation , epistemology , contradiction , appeal , zombie , supervenience , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , philosophy of science , philosophy of mind , eliminative materialism , psychology , metaphysics , chemistry , computer science , law , political science , biochemistry , computer security
Within the discourse surrounding mind-body interaction, mental causation is intimately associated with non-reductive physicalism. However, such a theory holds two opposing views: that all causal properties and relations can be explicated by physics and that special sciences have an explanatory role. Jaegwon Kim attempts to deconstruct this problematic contradiction by arguing that it is untenable for non-reductive physicalists to explain human behavior by appeal to mental properties. In combination, Kim’s critique of mental causation and the phenomenal concept strategy serves as an effectual response to the anti-physicalist stance enclosed within the Knowledge Argument and the Zombie Thought Experiment.