Open AccessSynthetic Biology and Natural Kinds
Author(s) -
Caleb Hazelwood
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
stance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1943-1899
pISSN - 1943-1880
DOI - 10.33043/s.10.1.14-23
Subject(s) - functionalism (philosophy of mind) , epistemology , property (philosophy) , taxon , natural (archaeology) , ecology , biology , cognitive science , evolutionary biology , philosophy , psychology , paleontology
In the life sciences, biologists and philosophers lack a unifying concept of species—one that will reconcile intuitive demarcations of taxa with the fluidity of phenotypes found in nature. One such attempt at solving this “species problem” is known as Homeostatic Property Cluster theory (HPC), which suggests that species are not defined by singular essences, but by clusters of properties that a species tends to possess. I contend that the arbitrary nature of HPC’s kind criteria would permit a biological brand of functionalism to inform species boundaries, thereby validating synthetic organisms as members of a species that do not belong