Open AccessHow Many and Why? Size Variation of National Delegations to Plenary Meetings of International Organizations
Author(s) -
Václav Vlček
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
mezinárodní vztahy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.153
H-Index - 3
eISSN - 2570-9429
pISSN - 0323-1844
DOI - 10.32422/mv-cjir.1684
Subject(s) - delegate , sovereignty , political science , variation (astronomy) , normative , public administration , politics , corporate governance , plenary session , law , management , economics , library science , physics , computer science , astrophysics , programming language
This article provides new insights into size variation of national delegations to plenary meetings of international organizations. Plenary meetings represent a symbol of national sovereignty and equality which is, however, often sidelined by structural opportunities and internal incentives which states have in practice. This article addresses the puzzle of whether the size of national delegations varies and what factors can explain possible geographical patterns. Drawing upon opportunity structure-incentive approach and using a newly created dataset covering 14 major agencies of the United Nations family, I suggest that it is mainly the structural factors what affects the size of national delegations, especially the power distribution. The findings also indicate that complex negotiations in large IOs motivate states to increase their delegation size, while regional cooperation allows them to delegate less representatives and rely on regional partners. Domestic incentives, on the contrary, seem to play little role, except for anticipated financial benefits from membership in the particular IOs.