Open AccessMood and force in defeasible arguments
Author(s) -
Ryan Quandt,
John Licato
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
argument and computation
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.38
H-Index - 20
eISSN - 1946-2166
pISSN - 1946-2174
DOI - 10.3233/aac-210553
Subject(s) - utterance , defeasible reasoning , computer science , assertion , defeasible estate , dilemma , meaning (existential) , task (project management) , argumentation theory , artificial intelligence , linguistics , natural language processing , cognitive psychology , psychology , epistemology , philosophy , management , economics , psychotherapist , programming language
Argumentation schemes bring artificial intelligence into day to day conversation. Interpreting the force of an utterance, be it an assertion, command, or question, remains a task for achieving this goal. But it is not an easy task. An interpretation of force depends on a speaker’s use of words for a hearer at the moment of utterance. Ascribing force relies on grammatical mood, though not in a straightforward or regular way. We face a dilemma: on one hand, deciding force requires an understanding of the speaker’s words; on the other hand, word meaning may shift given the force in which the words are spoken. A precise theory of how mood and force relate helps us handle this dilemma, which, if met, expands the use of argumentation schemes in language processing. Yet, as our analysis shows, force is an inconstant variable, one that contributes to a scheme’s defeasibility. We propose using critical questions to help us decide the force of utterances.