Ampurdán (1659–1690) – studium strategii obronnej Hiszpanii względem Francji w epoce Ludwika XIV

The main aim of this work is to present the strategic problem of creating a new defense system, protecting the main route from France to Spain, and pointing out that that decisions on defense strategy made in a given country are not always the result of choosing the most logical solution but in many cases depend on internal conflicts and the characteristics of the chain of command. Disagreements between people who occupy different ranks in the military hierarchy and the constant changes in command posts, resulting from the influx of new officers, are an additional factor that makes such decisions difficult. The lack of clear criteria for strategy and continuation of the adopted line of action leads to the search for alternative solutions to the same problem. As a result, the problem remains unresolved. This article allows us to see how a lack of initiative during the period in question led to a situation where during the four conflicts that took place between Spain and France at that time (the War of Devolution, 1667–1668; the Franco-Dutch War, 1673–1678; the War of the Reunions, 1683–1684 and the War of the League of Augsburg, 1689–1697),