Open AccessThe Uniqueness of Family Firms
Author(s) -
Harijono Harijono
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
ultima management/ultima management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2549-404X
pISSN - 2085-4587
DOI - 10.31937/manajemen.v2i1.168
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , agency (philosophy) , shareholder , incentive , principal–agent problem , uniqueness , business , control (management) , family business , investment (military) , power (physics) , empirical research , class (philosophy) , microeconomics , accounting , industrial organization , corporate governance , economics , marketing , finance , sociology , management , social psychology , law , epistemology , social science , political science , psychology , philosophy , chemistry , biochemistry , quantum mechanics , physics , politics
This study focuses on family business theory from two theories of the firm perspectives: the incomplete contract and the agency perspectives. It shows that families represent a special class of large shareholders that potentially have a unique incentive structure and power in the firm. The unique characteristics of family firms potentially make their performance and their corporate decisions making different from those of non-family firms. The empirical evidences tend to support this argument. However, further quantitative and qualitative research to establish the relations between family control and several aspects of corporate decision making in different institutional and cultural settings remains to be done.
Keywords: Agency, Control, Cultural, Family Business, Investment, Shareholders