Open AccessQuine's Poor Tom
Author(s) -
Tristan Grøtvedt Haze
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
european journal of analytic philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1849-0514
pISSN - 1845-8475
DOI - 10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
Subject(s) - quine , falsity , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , philosophy , raising (metalworking) , object (grammar) , presentation (obstetrics) , linguistics , mathematics , medicine , chemistry , biochemistry , geometry , radiology
Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.