Open AccessExplanation and Individual Essence
Author(s) -
Márta Ujvári
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
european journal of analytic philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1849-0514
pISSN - 1845-8475
DOI - 10.31820/ejap.13.2.2
Subject(s) - ontic , individuation , epistemology , converse , parallels , identity (music) , reading (process) , set (abstract data type) , sociology , philosophy , psychology , computer science , aesthetics , linguistics , psychoanalysis , mechanical engineering , engineering , programming language
In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, alternatively, the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual essence will also be considered.