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Agenda Control in Congress: Evidence from Cutpoint Estimates and Ideal Point Uncertainty
Author(s) -
STIGLITZ EDWARD H.,
WEINGAST BARRY R.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298010791170187
Subject(s) - lawmaking , ideal point , ideal (ethics) , econometrics , test (biology) , cartel , point (geometry) , control (management) , political science , positive economics , economics , statistics , law , mathematics , microeconomics , legislature , paleontology , geometry , management , biology , incentive
This article develops two new tests of partisan and nonpartisan theories of lawmaking based on cutpoint estimates and measures of uncertainty about ideal point estimates. Theories of congressional organization make explicit predictions about the absence of cutpoints in certain intervals of the policy space. We test these theories with new cutpoint estimates and exploit the fact that the ideal points of members located far from the density of cutpoints are necessarily estimated with less precision. We validate our empirical approach through simulations, and we test three models of congressional organization using House roll call data from the 86th through the 110th Congresses (1959–2008). We find strong evidence of partisan agenda control. Our findings exhibit modest differences from the results predicted by Cox and McCubbins's party cartel theory: negative agenda control increases over time and is negatively correlated with the size of the blockout region.