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Strategic Retirements: The Influence of Public Preferences On Voluntary Departures from Congress
Author(s) -
WOLAK JENNIFER
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298007780907897
Subject(s) - odds , turnover , vulnerability (computing) , political science , public economics , economics , demographic economics , public administration , logistic regression , medicine , computer security , computer science , management
Are members of Congress responsive to public preferences in their decisions to seek reelection or retire, or do members simply rely on the advantages of incumbency to secure reelection? I argue that members of Congress consider their electoral vulnerability when deciding whether or not to seek reelection, informing their reelection odds with the same short‐term electoral forces that influence election outcomes: partisan preferences, economic evaluations, and congressional approval. Considering aggregate rates of voluntary departures from the House and Senate from 1954 to 2004, I show that rates of retirement reflect, not only institutional environments within Congress, but also the mood of the electorate.