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Parties and Institutional Choice Revisited
Author(s) -
BINDER SARAH A.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298006x201913
Subject(s) - perspective (graphical) , politics , control (management) , accrual , institutional change , core (optical fiber) , political science , positive economics , public administration , law and economics , political economy , economics , law , accounting , management , materials science , earnings , artificial intelligence , computer science , composite material
Scholars of institutional change in Congress offer competing theoretical accounts of the accrual of procedural rights by House majority parties. One camp posits that the interests and capacities of political parties drive procedural change that affects agenda control. An alternative perspective offers a nonpartisan, median‐voter account. I explore these two accounts, survey challenges involved in testing them, and determine the fit of the accounts to the history of procedural change in the House. I find that no single perspective accounts best for the pattern of rule changes affecting agenda control and that the median‐voter model may be time‐bound to the twentieth century—after partisan majorities had constructed the core partisan procedural regime of the House.