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Term Limits, Campaign Contributions, and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures
Author(s) -
APOLLONIO D.E.,
RAJA RAYMOND J.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298006x201805
Subject(s) - caucus , legislature , term (time) , power (physics) , state (computer science) , political science , distribution (mathematics) , limit (mathematics) , public administration , politics , law , computer science , mathematics , physics , mathematical analysis , algorithm , quantum mechanics
Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross‐state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank‐and‐file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.