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How Parties Create Electoral Democracy, Chapter 2
Author(s) -
CARROLL ROYCE,
COX GARY W.,
PACHÓN MÓNICA
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298006x201760
Subject(s) - democracy , cabinet (room) , legislature , corporate governance , competition (biology) , selection (genetic algorithm) , political science , mega , divided government , law and economics , politics , public administration , business , political economy , economics , law , computer science , finance , engineering , ecology , physics , astronomy , artificial intelligence , biology , mechanical engineering
Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega‐seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.