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Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House Members: The Spiraling Costs of the Permanent Campaign
Author(s) -
HEBERLIG ERIC S.,
LARSON BRUCE A.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298005x201699
Subject(s) - caucus , position (finance) , competition (biology) , business , control (management) , single member district , public administration , economics , voting , political science , finance , law , politics , group voting ticket , management , ecology , biology
In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistribution of campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election cycles. By examining the contribution activity of members' leadership PACs and principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a function of that member's institutional position: the greater the position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.