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The Senatorial Courtesy Game: Explaining the Norm of Informal Vetoes in Advice and Consent Nominations
Author(s) -
JACOBI TONJA
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298005x201518
Subject(s) - courtesy , salience (neuroscience) , norm (philosophy) , veto , generosity , advice (programming) , social psychology , reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , law , political science , law and economics , psychology , sociology , computer science , politics , cognitive psychology , programming language
Despite the contentiousness of advice and consent nominations, the Senate usually rejects a candidate to whom a home senator objects. Using game theory, this article explains the persistence of senatorial courtesy and maps its effects on which candidates succeed. The greater salience of a home nomination allows retaliation and reciprocity in a repeated game to elicit support for a veto, even under adverse conditions. Comparative statics indicate the range of the president's feasible nominees and show which players gain and lose from the practice. Most notably, the president can benefit from an exercise of senatorial courtesy.