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Preferences, Partisanship, and Whip Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives
Author(s) -
BURDEN BARRY C.,
FRISBY TAMMY M.
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298004x201302
Subject(s) - whip (tree) , persuasion , house of representatives , roll call , democracy , political science , set (abstract data type) , law , voting , social psychology , politics , psychology , computer science , forestry , programming language , geography
Using Democratic whip counts from the 92d House, we compare representatives' stated intentions to their actual roll‐call votes to detect evidence of party pressure. After arguing that this strategy understates real party influence, we nonetheless point to evidence of member conversion by party leaders. On 16 bills analyzed, two‐thirds of the switches between the count and the vote occur in the direction favored by party leaders. We examine one bill in depth, showing how the efforts of party leaders were consequential to the outcome. The pattern of movement on this bill, along with data from the larger set of bills, provides evidence that leaders act strategically, targeting the members whose persuasion requires the fewest resources.