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Bicameralism and Geographic Politics: Allocating Funds in the House and Senate
Author(s) -
LEE FRANCES E.
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298004x201140
Subject(s) - distributive property , representation (politics) , incentive , politics , house of representatives , public administration , order (exchange) , political science , federal funds , categorical variable , business , economics , finance , law , microeconomics , monetary economics , monetary policy , computer science , mathematics , pure mathematics , machine learning
Because they represent different kinds of constituencies—states versus parts of states—senators and House members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized benefits, House members need to use policy tools—earmarks and narrow categorical programs—that target funds to their constituencies. Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money. Examining House‐Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts.