Premium
State‐Level Institutional Effects on Legislative Coalition Unity in Brazil
Author(s) -
CAREY JOHN M.,
REINHARDT GINA YANNITELL
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298004x201087
Subject(s) - legislature , alliance , voting , competition (biology) , chamber of deputies , political science , state (computer science) , political economy , public administration , lower house , public economics , economics , politics , law , democracy , computer science , biology , ecology , algorithm
How do subnational factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together? We estimate the effects of two institutional forces operating at the state level—intralist electoral competition and alliance with governors—on voting unity among coalition cohorts to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, are less unified than smaller cohorts. We find no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, a result suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape governors' influence relative to that of national‐level legislative actors.