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The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics
Author(s) -
WILKINS VICKY M.,
YOUNG GARRY
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
legislative studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.728
H-Index - 54
eISSN - 1939-9162
pISSN - 0362-9805
DOI - 10.3162/036298002x200729
Subject(s) - veto , legislator , legislature , politics , political science , ideology , test (biology) , preference , public administration , law and economics , political economy , law , sociology , economics , legislation , microeconomics , biology , paleontology
Using the “switcher” analysis developed by Krehbiel (1998), we examine the ability of Missouri governors to sway legislators on veto override attempts. Our initial results closely mirror Krehbiel's finding that the chief executive successfully achieves influence at and around the veto pivot, but these results change once we take into account the political party of the legislators. Governors are far more likely to influence legislators from their own party, regardless of legislator ideology. Our study provides a rare systematic analysis of gubernatorial influence in the legislative arena, while also contributing to the current debate over preference‐based versus partisan‐based theories of legislatures.