Open AccessAn Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
Author(s) -
Sanny Diniz Barbosa,
Diogo de Carvalho Bezerra
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
economic analysis of law review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2178-0587
DOI - 10.31501/ealr.v12i3.12880
Subject(s) - inefficiency , principal (computer security) , liability , process (computing) , business , law and economics , computer science , law , economics , microeconomics , computer security , political science , accounting , operating system
The inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals.