Open AccessWarunki sukcesu poprawek Parlamentu Europejskiego w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej
Author(s) -
Adam Kirpsza
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
przegląd europejski
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2657-6023
pISSN - 1641-2478
DOI - 10.31338/1641-2478pe.2.16.3
Subject(s) - presidency , legislature , parliament , negotiation , council of ministers , political science , public administration , commission , european commission , law , business , european union , politics , economic policy
The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament’s amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it takes seven actions. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high.