The conflict free arena? Effects of procedure of selecting local heads in large Russian cities

Local self-government in Russia throughout its history has remained a place for constant reforming. Amendments to the federal law from 2015 introduced a new procedure of selecting local heads or mayors – through competition commissions with a subsequent vote in local assemblies. By now, this selection model has become the most widespread among Russian municipalities. There is no surprise that regional authorities encourage the introduction of this selection model as it endows them with more power over local elites. In our study, we question whether the new model of selecting municipal heads via competition leave the room for municipal autonomy? In which cases we can detect instances of administrative autonomy? To answer these questions, we rely on the new data on the voting results within municipal assemblies in 158 cases of selecting local mayors in Russian cities with population of more than 100 thousand people. The key findings stem from the regression analysis and they are as follows. Firstly, the competition procedure in big cities leaves little room for local autonomy, even in competitive cities the winning candidates receive an overwhelming majority of votes in local assemblies. Secondly, uniform voting is more widespread in mono-towns, while the development of small and medium-size business does not prevent the elite consolidation and even strengthens the loyalty of local assemblies. There is some evidence of ‘the disciplining effect’ of the so-called ‘varangian’ governors. Lastly, a more competitive electoral profile as well as the presence of local intra-elite clashes reinforces the voting diversity and autonomy of local assemblies.