
A COUPLE OF COLLECTIVE UTILITY ANDMINIMUM PAYOFF PARITY LOSS RULES FOR REFINING NASH EQUILIBRIA IN BIMATRIX GAMES WITH ASYMMETRIC PAYOFFS
Author(s) -
Vadim Romanuke
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
vìsnik kremenčucʹkogo deržavnogo polìtehničnogo unìversitetu ìmenì mihajla ostrogradsʹkogo/vìsnik kremenčucʹkogo deržavnogo polìtehnìčnogo unìversitetu ìmenì mihajla ostrogradsʹkogo
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2072-8263
pISSN - 1995-0519
DOI - 10.30929/1995-0519.2018.1.38-43
Subject(s) - mathematical economics , nash equilibrium , risk dominance , stochastic game , epsilon equilibrium , generality , best response , mathematics , repeated game , traveler's dilemma , trembling hand perfect equilibrium , economics , game theory , management