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Analytic Tradition in Law: Through the Analysis of Language to the Reconstruction of Social Order
Author(s) -
Liana A. Tukhvatulina
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
filosofskie nauki
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2618-8961
pISSN - 0235-1188
DOI - 10.30727/0235-1188-2020-63-8-47-55
Subject(s) - jurisprudence , interpretation (philosophy) , ideal (ethics) , interpreter , law , philosophy of law , sociology , epistemology , law enforcement , order (exchange) , law and economics , public law , political science , computer science , philosophy , economics , linguistics , finance , programming language
The article reconstructs the premises of the reception of analytic philosophy in jurisprudence and shows that the development of a method for clarifying the meanings of legal concepts is not least connected with the problem of legitimizing law enforcement. The article analyzes H.L.A. Hart’s approach to the problem of correlation between the “letter” and “spirit” of the law in the process of interpreting legal norms. The article argues that the process of interpretation is determined teleologically. In its limit, the interpretation of legal norms presupposes the re-creation of the desired image of society, the reconstruction of such social ontology that is most consistent with the ideal of achieving social welfare. The article examines the collision of the “ideal of order” and the “ideal of justice” as two regulations of law enforcement. The author believes that the interpretation of this collision within the analytical tradition was characterized by a gradual movement from the ideal of “mechanical” law enforcement, which minimizes the creative role of the interpreter, to the ideal of flexible interpretation focused on achieving legal goals in a changing environment. It is noted that, according to analytic approach, a theoretical solution to this conflict was proposed due to the development of the ideas of an “open texture” of law (H.L.A. Hart, F. Waismann). The author demonstrates that the development of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence has shown that the criticism of language and the interpretation of meanings are not technical tasks, but it presupposes the construction of a metaphysics of law. In this regard, the author concludes: the development of the ideas of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence demonstrates that the thesis about the absence of a positive program in analytic philosophy, put forward in the first (A.L. Nikiforov’s) article of the discussion, can be challenged.

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