Imagined, Supplemental Sound in Nineteenth-Century Piano Music

In this article, I argue that real sound (as made by performers), bodily engagement, and imagined, supplemental sound function in a mutually influential, tripartite relationship in musical embodiment. Embodiment studies give little attention to different types of imagined sound and sonic filtering. Yet our different bodily engagements with physical sound lead us to “hear” sound differently. My conception of imagined, supplemental sound includes not just the internal mimicking of sounds actually heard while listening to or performing music, but the supplemental sounds we “perform” internally (even when engaged in a sounding performance) in order to make sense of real sounds and render performances personally meaningful. I argue that our bodily engagements—as shaped by the real sounds performers make—in turn shape our imagined, supplemental sounds and/or filtered sounds. This article divides into two parts. In part 1 I outline some of the basic mechanisms of musical embodiment, such as imagining the actions needed to produce sounds, and attributing intentionality to sonic forms in order to conceive of musical “objects” or “bodies” moving through “musical space.” I illustrate how specific performance nuances can shape such bodily engagements, and in turn shape one’s imagined, supplemental sounds. In part 2—the heart of the article—I present evidence, from the nineteenth century to today, that imagining supplemental sound is a necessary part of performing and listening to piano music. My focus is on a particular kind of imagined, supplemental sound (fluid, connective sound) experienced in a particular “mode of embodiment,” in which we experience a melody as a continuous path. Imagined sounds, like bodily exertions, are shaped not only by compositional features, but also by common techniques of illusion pianists use in various musical contexts, as I demonstrate through detailed analyses of recorded excerpts. I argue that our imagined sounds profoundly affect our musical experience and sense of embodied agency—our most basic sources of musical meaning. I thus argue that imagined sounds must be considered vital parts of the musical “object” we discuss, analyze and theorize.