Open Access„Otvorený vesmír“ ako podmienka možnosti slobody podľa K. R. Poppera
Author(s) -
Miroslav Karaba
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
studia bobolanum
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2720-1686
pISSN - 1642-5650
DOI - 10.30439/2020.1.11
Subject(s) - indeterminism , determinism , openness to experience , free will , epistemology , order (exchange) , philosophy , freedom of choice , state (computer science) , karl popper , law and economics , sociology , law , political science , psychology , mathematics , social psychology , economics , finance , algorithm
In analysing the problem of freedom and free will, Popper concluded that we need something in order to understand rational human behaviour that is by its very nature between total chance and complete determinism. In this article, we state that Popper has in fact not produced any evidence in favour of human freedom. Rather, his arguments are based on an attempt to avert a situation which he finds unacceptable. The openness of the physical world involves only that this world is not entirely determined by its own laws or causes. In the world of mental entities, however, there may be certain phenomena that affect our behaviour, so even though we are not physically determined, we could be mentally determined. Popper’s effort to promote indeterminism and the consequent possibility of human freedom do not seem to be based on evidence, but rather on the belief that without freedom of choice our situation would be merely a tragic farce. That is why Popper ultimately turns to moral motives in his defence of human freedom.