Open AccessRECIPROCAL DUMPING AND ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
Author(s) -
Salvador Sandoval Bravo,
Semei Coronado,
Jesús Porras Serrano
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
panorama económico
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1870-2171
DOI - 10.29201/pe-ipn.v7i14.67
Subject(s) - dumping , reciprocal , environmental tax , oligopoly , economics , microeconomics , natural resource economics , marginal cost , pollution , environmental science , public economics , tax reform , cournot competition , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , biology
This paper calculates the optimal tax of the emission of polluting agents in oligopolistic possess and under conditions of the reciprocal dumping, in which the firms count on the appropriate technology to decrease the pollution and can decide the amount of emissions generated. In this model the optimal tax mainly depends on the amount of the marginal disutility to pollute, as well as the abatement cost.