The Human Right to Internet Access: A Philosophical Defense
Author(s) -
Kay Mathiesen
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
the international review of information ethics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2563-5638
DOI - 10.29173/irie299
Subject(s) - the internet , human rights , duty , oppression , political science , internet access , internet privacy , position (finance) , sociology , law , business , computer science , world wide web , politics , finance
The United Nations has suggested that access to the Internet is a human right. In this paper, I defend the U.N.’s position against a number of challenges. First, I show that Vinton Cerf’s recent rejection of the human right to the Internet is based on a misunderstanding of the nature and structure of human rights. Second, I argue that the Internet enables the right to communicate, which is a linchpin right, and, thus, states have a duty to see to it that citizens have access to Internet technology. Third, I argue that concerns that the Internet can be used to engage in oppression and imperialism do not show that there is not a human right to it. Rather, it shows that the right to the Internet must be understood as part of a larger system of human rights.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom