Dualismo/antidualismo: dos tipos de relacionalidad en la teoría sociológica contemporánea

The distinction between holism and individualism has proven to be insufficient to understand the diversity of new positions related to the agency/structure debate. As a consequence, in the last years, the distinction between dualism and antidualism has appeared to improve these limitations and deficiencies (Archer, 1995; Decoteau, 2015; Piiroinen, 2014). Both dualism and antidualism can be related to the idea of a relational “turn” in contemporary social theory (Prandini, 2015). Theories which are representative of this turn share the intention of overcoming the failures of both holism and individualism, and of integrating the analysis of agency and structure in more complex theories. However, the so-called relational “turn” includes a wide range of differing theories. Thus, the distinction dualism/antidualism points out one of the most fundamental differences: that agency and structure constitute a synthetic and indissoluble unit and, therefore, there is an “ontological complicity” between them (Bourdieu, 1981); or to think of  both as autonomous but interrelated dimensions with causal powers on their own and, therefore, what is actually observed is  an “ontological hiatus” (Archer, 1995). A specific form of conceiving relationality can be derived from each position. The aim of this article is to present both perspectives under the label of structural relationality (antidualism) and contingent relationality (dualism).