Open AccessEffective Marginal Tax Rates for Working for Families Recipients
Author(s) -
Phillip Spier
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
labour, employment and work in new zealand
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2463-2600
DOI - 10.26686/lew.v0i0.1698
Subject(s) - receipt , beneficiary , earnings , incentive , demographic economics , tax credit , business , work (physics) , labour economics , public economics , economics , accounting , microeconomics , finance , mechanical engineering , engineering
This paper examines how the Working for Families (WFF) package changed work incentives for WFF recipient families. While not being able to examine work incentives directly, we were able to measure changes in effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) for WFF recipients. The lower the EMTR a person faces, the more financially profitable it is for them to increase their hours of work or earnings. Conversely, a high EMTR over a range of earnings can be a disincentive for a person to work more. Beneficiary families and the vast majority of low income nonbeneficiary families in receipt of WFF had lower EMTRs as a result of the policy changes. The April 2006 changes to the WFF package decreased EMTRs for middletohigh income families already in receipt of WFF Tax Credits, but increased EMTRs for families who became newly eligible for this component as a direct result of the changes.