Open AccessLogical Truth
Author(s) -
Paal Fjeldvig Antonsen
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
australasian journal of logic
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1448-5052
DOI - 10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5914
Subject(s) - sentence , logical consequence , modality (human–computer interaction) , epistemology , criticism , logical truth , linguistics , selection (genetic algorithm) , subject (documents) , logical analysis , philosophy , logical form , computer science , natural language processing , artificial intelligence , mathematics , literature , art , mathematical statistics , statistics , library science
On the model-theoretic account, a sentence is logically true just in case it is true on all possible semantic interpretations. We dierentiate four ways one can interpret the modality 'possible' in this definition, and argue that one of these readings is not subject to the criticism levelled against the model-theoretic account by Etchemendy. By explicating the four readings we also draw some consequences for what linguistic evidence a selection of logical theories should be sensitive to.