Open AccessParaconsistency and its Philosophical Interpretations
Author(s) -
Eduardo Alejandro Barrio,
Bruno Da Ré
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
the australasian journal of logic
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1448-5052
DOI - 10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4860
Subject(s) - paraconsistent logic , feature (linguistics) , epistemology , connection (principal bundle) , position (finance) , computer science , philosophy , artificial intelligence , mathematics , description logic , linguistics , economics , geometry , finance , multimodal logic
Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom