Open AccessCan Streumer Simply Avoid Supervenience?
Author(s) -
Luke Elson
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
journal of ethics and social philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1559-3061
DOI - 10.26556/jesp.v16i3.508
Subject(s) - supervenience , normative , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , simple (philosophy) , philosophy , realism , moral realism , metaphysics , moral psychology , chemistry , biochemistry
In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new ‘reduction’ argument against non- reductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his ‘simple moral theory’ version of the argument does not rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.