Open AccessNUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM OF THE DPRK AND IRAN IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
Author(s) -
A.I KOZINETS,
M.A SOROKIN
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
azimut naučnyh issledovanij: èkonomika i upravlenie
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2712-8482
pISSN - 2309-1762
DOI - 10.26140/anie-2021-1001-0007
Subject(s) - nuclear weapon , context (archaeology) , treaty , political science , security council , agency (philosophy) , international security , atomic energy , international trade , nuclear proliferation , law , business , sociology , geography , politics , social science , archaeology
This article examines the nuclear programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the context of the current state of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of the cornerstones of global security. The legal basis for this regime is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. Within the framework of this document, the circle of states that have the right to develop and possess nuclear weapons and the circle of states that do not have such a right are strictly defined. The main international body responsible for overseeing compliance with the NPT provisions is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the event of violations of the nonproliferation regime that pose a clear threat to global security, the appropriate response should be from the UN Security Council, as the main structure designed to ensure global security. Nevertheless, today there are serious problems with the preservation of the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, these problems are caused by the developing nuclear programs of the DPRK and Iran, which do not have the right to possess nuclear weapons under the NPT. The authors analyze the content of a number of international documents adopted by the IAEA and the UN Security Council to identify the common and specific in the nuclear programs of these two countries, and also consider various scenarios for resolving the existing problems of violation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.