Open AccessConditional analysis of free will and consequence argument
Author(s) -
Maria A. Sekatskaya
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
omskij naučnyj vestnik. seriâ "obŝestvo. istoriâ. sovremennostʹ"
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2541-7983
pISSN - 2542-0488
DOI - 10.25206/2542-0488-2020-5-4-61-65
Subject(s) - compatibilism , argument (complex analysis) , determinism , free will , incompatibilism , counterfactual thinking , epistemology , philosophy , argument map , meaning (existential) , phrase , linguistics , argumentation theory , chemistry , biochemistry
The conditional analysis of the meaning of the phrase “free will” is a classical compatibilist strategy, first introduced by David Hume and still widely used by compatibilists. The consequence argument is an influential argument against compatibilism. If the consequence argument is sound, then physical determinism is incompatible with alternative possibilities for any agent. In this article, I consider the relationship between the consequence argument and classical compatibilism. I demonstrate that the consequence argument uses premises that should be rejected by proponents of the counterfactual conditional analysis of free will