
Intellectual Integrity as Intellectual Virtue
Author(s) -
Konstantin G. Frolov
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
sibirskij filosofskij žurnal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2541-7517
DOI - 10.25205/2541-7517-2020-18-2-85-97
Subject(s) - dishonesty , academic dishonesty , virtue , intellectual disability , intellectual property , psychology , intellectual development , outcome (game theory) , epistemology , social psychology , cheating , political science , law , philosophy , economics , developmental psychology , mathematical economics , psychiatry
In this paper, I examine intellectual integrity as one of the possible intellectual virtues. I also try to investigate the opposite notion, intellectual dishonesty. I conclude that intellectual dishonesty does not necessarily entail dishonesty in the moral sense, but just presupposes that an agent has her interest in a certain outcome of her research and that it influences her actions. The analyzed problem then looks as follows: on the one hand, we have every reason to believe that intellectual integrity is desirable for a researcher; on the other hand, this requirement is not strictly necessary. Why? I show that although intellectual dishonesty negatively affects an agent’s personal ability to comprehend the truth, it can contribute to the achievement of the truth at the social level. We get such an outcome as a result of the confrontation of such motivated agents.