Open AccessEl papel de las ETTs en la reducción del riesgo moral asociado al seguro por accidentes de trabajo: El caso de España
Author(s) -
Alfonso Moral de Blas,
Ángel Martín Román,
Juan Carlos Caballero
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
estudios de economía aplicada
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1697-5731
pISSN - 1133-3197
DOI - 10.25115/eea.v31i2.3338
Subject(s) - moral hazard , welfare economics , political science , work (physics) , humanities , economics , philosophy , engineering , incentive , microeconomics , mechanical engineering
The presence of temporary work agencies (TWAs) in Spain is relatively recent in comparison with other countries where there is a longer tradition. Nevertheless, despite their short historical existence, their role in the labour market has outstandingly changed. In this paper, we intend to consider the effort of the workers who are hired through TWAs by means of the analysis of a number of accident reports, usually known as hard to diagnose accidents. There are evidences that the workers that are hired through a TWA show lower levels of moral hazard than the ones with a permanent contract and with a direct temporary one. These last results can indicate that TWAs play an important role in promoting the effort of the workers, which can not only be attributed to the fact that they manage temporary contracts.