In Defense of Privacy: The Concept and the Regime

It has recently become fashionable within the surveillance studies community to subject the concept and regime of “privacy protection” to some very rigorous criticism.   “Privacy” and all that it entails is argued to be too narrow, too based on liberal assumptions of subjectivity, too implicated in rights-based theory and discourse, insufficiently sensitive to the social sorting and discriminatory aspects of surveillance, and overly embroiled in spatial metaphors about “invasion” and “intrusion.”  As a concept, and as a way to frame the various social and political challenges encountered within “surveillance societies,” it is inadequate.   These critiques are important, and to some extent, have set scholarly inquiry on a new, exciting and broader, trajectory than that offered by privacy scholars. On closer examination, however, these critiques are often based on some faulty assumptions about the contemporary framing of the privacy issue, and about the governance of the issue.  Privacy, as a concept, regime, a set of policy instruments, and as a way to frame civil society activism, shows an extraordinary resilience. Surveillance scholars must learn to live with it.