
Failure to collectively assess security surveillance technologies will inevitably lead to an absolute surveillance society.
Author(s) -
Timothy Mitchener-Nissen
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
surveillance and society
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.781
H-Index - 46
ISSN - 1477-7487
DOI - 10.24908/ss.v12i1.4364
Subject(s) - absolute (philosophy) , assertion , computer security , national security , law and economics , internet privacy , computer science , law , political science , sociology , epistemology , philosophy , programming language
When assessing any security technology which impacts upon privacy, whether this constitutes a new technology or the novel application of existing technologies, we should do so by examining the combined effect of all security interventions currently employed within a society. This contrasts with the prevailing system whereby the impact of a new security technology is predominantly assessed on an individual basis by a subjective balancing of the security benefits of that technology against any reductions in concomitant rights, such as privacy and liberty. I contend that by continuing to focus on the individual effect, as opposed to the combined effects, of security technologies within a society the likelihood of sleep-walking into (or indeed waking-up in) an absolute surveillance society moves from a possible future to the logically inevitable future. This conclusion is based on two underlying assertions. Firstly that assessing a technology often entails a judgement of whether any loss in privacy is legitimised by a justifiable increase in security; however one fundamental difference between these two rights is that privacy is a finite resource with identifiable end-states (i.e. absolute privacy through to the absolute absence of privacy) whereas security does not have two finite end-states (while there exists the absolute absence of security, absolute security is an unobtainable yet desired goal). The second assertion, which relies upon the validity of the first, holds that one consequence of absolute security being unobtainable yet desirable is that new security interventions will continuously be developed, each potentially trading a small measure of privacy for a small rise in security. Examined individually each intervention may constitute a justifiable trade-off. However this approach of combining interventions in the search for ever greater security will ultimately reduce privacy to zero.